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NOTES
DRUMMING OUT THE INTENT OF THE INDIAN
MINERAL LEASING ACT OF 1938
Peter F. Carroll
I.

INTRODUCTION

Historically, states could not tax Indian interests on Indian lands
without express congressional authorization.' Not until 1924 did Congress2
enact specific legislation that allowed states to tax Indian mineral leases.
The applicability of that act was limited to Indian lands which were bought
and paid for until Congress enacted the Act of March 3, 1927 a Together
the acts allowed the states to tax mineral leases on most Indian lands.
The 1924 and 1927 Acts were only two of several that formed the
Indian mineral leasing program. 4 In 1938, Congress enacted legislation
that was designed, in part, to bring uniformity to that program. 5 The
Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938, however, did not contain any
provisions expressly allowing states to tax Indian mineral leases. Nevertheless, states continued to levy taxes against the production of minerals on
Indian lands.' In 1977, an Interior Department decision suggested that
states did not have authority to tax Indian mineral leases executed under
the 1938 Act.7 The Interior decision was the impetus for Montana v.
Blackfeet Tribe," a case which analyzed the state's authority to tax Indian
mineral leases on the Blackfeet Reservation in Montana. This casenote
1. See, e.g., The Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 737 (1866); The New York Indians, 72 U.S.
(5 Wall.) 761 (1866); Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665 (i912); and Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373

(1976).
2, Act of May 29, 1924, ch. 210, 43 Stat. 244 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 398 (1982)).
3. Act of March 3, 1927, ch. 299,44 Stat. 1347 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 398a-398e (1982)).
This act allowed taxation of Indian mineral leases on reservations created by Executive Order. Its
provisions were similar to the 1924 Act which specifically applied to reservations that were bought and

paid for by the Tribes.
4. The mineral leasing of Indian lands was first authorized in statute by the General Allotment
Act of 1891.

5. Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938, ch. 198,52 Stat. 347 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 396a-396f
(1982)).
6. In Montana, the appropriate taxes were collected from the non-Indian lessees who in turn
deducted the amount of taxes from the royalty payments to the tribes. Blackfeet v. Montana, 507 F
Supp. 446 (D. Mont. 1981).
7. 84 Interior Dec. 905 (1977).
8. 105 S. Ct. 2399 (1985).
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discusses the Montana v. Blackfeet litigation, the Supreme Court's
determination of the case and its impact on the Indian mineral leasing

program.
II.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

The General Allotment Act of 18879 established a policy of dividing
and allocating tribal lands among individual tribal members. The 1887 Act

initiated an era in which national policy sought to assimilate the Indian into
a Western European lifestyle.' 0 In 1891, the 1887 Act was amended to
allow, for the first time, mineral leasing of Indian lands." The 1891 Act
provided that the Secretary of the Interior (Secretary) could issue mineral
leases on unallotted Indian lands "not needed for farming or agricultural
purposes, and are not desired for individual allotments. . ".."' Although
3
the 1891 Act applied only to Indian lands that were bought and paid for,
it did allow the Secretary to lease unimproved and unused allotments under
14

certain conditions.
The 1891 Act established the Indian mineral leasing program which

was added to or amended several times in the next thirty years.' 5 In 1924
Congress made significant changes to that program. 6 The Act of May 29,
1924 provided that oil and gas leases, limited to ten-year terms in the 1891
Act, were to remain in effect as long as the leases were productive.' 7 The
1924 Act also authorized the states to tax Indian royalties received from
the production of all minerals on Indian lands.' 8 The scope of the 1924 Act
was limited, however, in that the Act specifically applied only to Indian
9. General Allotment Act of 1887, ch. 119,24 Stat. 388 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331,332,333,
334, 339, 341, 342, 348, 349, 354, 381 (1982)).
10. See generally F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 128-36 (1982).
11. Act of February 28, 1891, ch. 383,26 Stat. 794 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331,336, 371,397
(1982)).
12. 25 U.S.C. § 397 (1982).
13. Id. The distinction between Indian lands that were bought and paid for and those that were
received through an Executive Order, lost its significance with the enactment of the 1938 Act. That Act
applied equally to all Indian lands. See, 84 Interior Dec. 905, 914 (1977).
14. 25 U.S.C. § 397.
15. Only those acts concerning state taxation of oil and gas leases on Indian lands are discussed
in this casenote. The several acts affecting the Indian mineral leasing program in the interim are as
follows: Act of March 3, 1909, ch. 263, 35 Stat. 781 (an act that allowed the individual Indian allottee
to lease lands for minerals under guidance of theSecretary); Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 431, § 4,36 Stat.
855, 856-57 (an act which gave the Secretary control of the proceeds from allottee leases and limited
the term of these leases to five years); Appropriation Act of June 30, 1919, ch. 4, § 26,41 Stat. 3, 31-34
(an act which governed the mining of metalliferous minerals on Indian reservations in several
designated western states.)
16. Act of May 29, 1924, ch. 210, 43 Stat. 244 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 398 (1982)).
17. Id.
18. Id. While the Act extended the lease term for oil and gas leases only, the tax authority
applied to the production of all minerals.
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lands subject to lease under the 1891 Act.19 The Act of March 3, 1927
extended the states' tax authority to reach Indian mineral leases on Indian
reservations created by Executive Order.2" Following the enactment of the
1927 Act, and unless Congress had provided otherwise, the Secretary could
authorize oil and gas leases for an indefinite term on all Indian lands.
In 1934, Congress enacted the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA). 21
The IRA abruptly reversed more than forty years of federal policy toward
Indians, ending programs of assimilation and fully encouraging the
autonomous development of Indian tribes. The IRA established the
framework for Indian tribe reorganization, 22 extended indefinitely all
existing periods of trust and restrictions against the alienation of Indian
lands,23 restored all unused land within reservation boundaries to tribal
ownership 24 and, generally, provided a foundation for the protections
afforded tribes today. Most importantly, the IRA allowed tribes that
reorganized under the Act tremendous autonomy in governing the use of
their own lands.25
The various laws affecting the Indian mineral leasing program, when
combined with the tribal autonomy provided by the IRA, left the mineral
leasing program in a confused state. The Secretary, recognizing several
problems in the Indian mineral leasing program, suggested to Congress in
1937 that comprehensive legislation be enacted to correct those
problems.26 The Secretary's suggestions were incorporated into the Indian
mineral leasing program by the Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938.27
With the 1938 Act, Congress sought to bring uniformity to the Indian
mineral leasing program, to bring the program into harmony with the IRA,
and to ensure the Indians received the greatest return on their leases. 28 The
1938 Act established that a tribal council could lease mineral leases with
the Secretary's approval,2 9 provided that Indian mineral leases be issued on
a competitive basis, 30 and allowed the mineral leasing of restricted lands
19. Id.
20. Act of March 3, 1927, ch. 299,44 Stat. 1347 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 398a-398e (1982)).
21. Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, ch. 576,48 Stat. 984 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479
(1982)).
22. Id. §§ 476-479.
23. Id. § 462.
24. Id. § 463.
25. Id. § 476.
26. See H.R. Rep. No. 1872, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 1 (1938).
27. 25 U.S.C. §§ 396a and 396f (1982).
28. These are the main intentions of Congress as found in the legislative history of the Act. The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals identified these intentions and the Supreme Court adopted those
findings. See Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, 105 S. Ct. at 2404 n.5.
29. 25 U.S.C. § 396a (1982).
30. Id. § 396b.
I
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under specific guidelines .3 The 1938 Act was silent on the question of
taxation. The Act did contain a general repealer clause, "[a]ll Act [sic] or
parts of Acts inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed". 32 The critical
difference between the 1938 Act and the 1924 and 1927 Acts is that the
1938 Act did not expressly allow states to tax Indian mineral leases.
III.

CASE HISTORY

In 1977 the Department's Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs
requested an opinion from the Solicitor's Office on the applicability of
Montana's mineral production taxes to Indian mineral leases on the Fort
Peck Indian reservation. 3 The Solicitor, in turn, sought to determine
which Indian mineral leases, if any, were taxable by the state. The Solicitor
noted the comprehensive nature of the 1938 Act and the chief differences
between it and earlier Indian mineral leasing acts. He determined that the
state did not have authority to tax Indian mineral leases on the reservation
since they were all executed under the 1938 Act.3 4That opinion reversed
more than thirty years of policy that permitted states to tax Indian mineral
leases issued under the 1938 Act. The opinion also provided the impetus for
the Blackfeet Tribe of Indians to litigate the same question.
The Blackfeet Tribe brought suit in federal district court to challenge
the State of Montana's right to levy mineral taxes against Indian mineral
leases on tribal lands.3 5 Those taxes were assessed against Indian royalty
interests in oil and gas leases issued to non-Indian lessees. 36 Citing the
Department's 1977 decision, 7 the Tribe argued that the 1938 Act repealed
the tax authorization granted to states in earlier acts. The state urged the
court to find that the previous tax authorizations apply equally to Indian
mineral leases granted under the 1938 Act. On a motion for summary
judgment the district court found for the state declaring:
31. Id. § 396(c) and (d).
32. Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938, ch. 198, § 7, 52 Stat. 347, 348. The general repealing
clause should legally be a nullity, but has sometimes been found to repeal previous acts where the latter
act conflicts. See, IA C. Sands, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 23.08 (4th ed. 1985).
33. 84 Interior Dec. 905 (1977).
34. Id. at 914.
35. Blackfeet Tribe v. Montana, 507 F. Supp. 446 (D. Mont. 1981).
36. The following Montana tax statutes were challenged:
(1) The Oil and Gas Conservation Tax, MONT. CODE ANN. § 82-11-131 (1985);
(2) The Resource Indemnity Trust Act, MONT. CODE ANN. § 15-38-104 (1985);
(3) The Oil and Gas Severance Tax, MONT. CODE ANN. § 15-36-101 (1985) and its
predecessor;
(4) The Oil and Gas Net Proceeds Tax, MONT. CODE ANN. § 15-23-601 (1985).
507 F. Supp. at 448 n.l.
37. While this issue was awaiting trial, the Department issued yet another opinion that re-stated
its 1977 position regarding the taxation of 1938 Act Indian mineral leases. See 86 Interior Dec. 181
(1979).
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The taxing power of the state in the 1924 Act is specific and
clear. The fact that a later act was passed with the general leasing
scheme of tribal lands does not, without more, repeal or otherwise
create an ambiguity which must be resolved in favor of the
Tribe's position.38
The Blackfeet Tribe appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
for review.39 The court of appeals recognized that any taxation of Indian
interests required congressional consent. 40 The court noted that although
the 1938 Act did not authorize taxation, the 1924 Act expressly allowed the
states to tax Indian mineral leases. The court of appeals stated that both
Acts must be given effect "absent a clearly expressed congressional
intention to the contrary. ' 41 Since the law disfavors repeal by implication,42 and the 1938 Act did not expressly repeal the 1924 Act, the court
found that the 1924 tax provision remained in effect.43 Despite the 1977
Interior Department decision, the court of appeals found further support
for the state's position in the long-standing administrative acquiescence to
the taxes.44 The court of appeals held that the 1924 Act tax authorization
applied "with equal force to leases made pursuant to the 1938 Act."' 45
The Blackfeet Tribe remained adamant in its position and petitioned
the court of appeals for a rehearing en banc. 4 6 The petition was granted to
resolve a conflict with an earlier decision from the same court. 47 In the
earlier decision, the court of appeals recognized that the 1938 Act may
have abandoned the tax authority previously allowed states in other acts.48
Before the court of appeals, sitting en banc, the Tribe presented a twopronged argument that developed during the original appellate hearing on
the question. The first prong argued that the 1938 Act repealed the 1924
Act; therefore, the 1924 tax provision could not apply to 1938 Act leases. A
significant feature of the 1924 Act, however, is that oil and gas leases under
38. Blackfeet Tribe, 507 F. Supp. at 452.
39. Blackfeet Tribe v. Groff, 729 F.2d 1185 (9th Cir. 1982) [hereinafter cited as Blackfeet 1].
40. Id. at 1186. See also supra note 1.
41. Blackfeet 1,729 F.2d at 1191 (quoting Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 552 (1974)).
42. Blackfeet 1, 729 F.2d at 1189.
43. Id. at 1191.
44. The court noted that unless the original interpretation of the statute by the Department was
clearly wrong it will not be disturbed. Id. at 1191 (citing United States v. Leslie Salt Co., 350 U.S. 383,
396 (1956)).
45. Blackfeet I, 729 F. 2d at 1191.
46. A rehearing en banc by a federal court of appeals is an exceptional safety device usually
reserved for cases involving issues of great moment. See Louisell and Ronan, Rehearingin American
Appellate Courts, 25 F.R.D. 143 (1932). See also FED. R. ApP. P. 35.
47. Blackfeet Tribe v. Montana, 729 F.2d 1192 (9th Cir. 1984) [hereinafter cited as Blackfeet
Ill.
48. Crow Tribe v. Montana, 650 F.2d 1104(9th Cir 1981), amended, 665 F.2d 1390 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 916 (1982).
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the Act had terms of indefinite duration. The court of appeals noted this
fact stating that the "legal status of indefinite term leases" would be
seriously affected if the 1938 Act had retroactive effect.4 9 Additionally, the
court of appeals cited specific language from the 1938 Act which expressly
limited its application to leases executed after its enactment. 50 The court
adopted these indicators, rejected the Tribe's first argument, and stated
that "the 1938 Act superceded but did not repeal prior leasing statutes
. . "I' Since the 1924 Act remained in effect, the court ruled that the
state's production taxes did apply to Indian mineral leases executed under
the 1924 Act. 52 That ruling, in effect, narrowed the issue to whether the
1924 Act's tax authorization applied to leases executed under the 1938
Act.
The second prong of the Tribe's argument asserted that, even without
repeal, the 1924 tax authorization did not apply to leases issued under the
1938 Act. The state countered this assertion by stating that the rules of
statutory construction supported the incorporation of the 1924 tax provision into the 1938 Act.5" The state also argued that the court of appeals
should defer to earlier administrative decisions that supported its tax
authority. The court rejected the state's first argument noting that rules of
statutory construction were "merely guideposts in determining congressional intent." 54 The court of appeals noted that there must be express
congressional consent before a state may tax tribal income.5 5 The court
also stated that it would not defer to an administrative practice merely
because of its earlier vintage. 56 Accordingly, the court held that the State
could continue to tax Indian mineral leases issued pursuant to the 1924 Act
but not those leases executed under the 1938 Act.57
The State of Montana petitioned the Supreme Court for review .58 The
Court granted certiorari 59 and the case was initially argued before the
Court in January, 1985.60 The Court was evenly divided following the

49. Blackfeet H, 729 F.2d at 1200.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. The canons that the state relied upon are as follows: "that where two statutes on the same
subject are not absolutely irreconcilable, both should be given effect.. . . [and] that a long held agency
interpretation in which Congress has silently acquiesed is entitled to great deference." Id. at 1201.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1202.
56. Id. at 1203.
57. Id.
58. 53 U.S.L.W. 3137 (U.S. August 1984).
59. 105 S. Ct. 80 (1984).
60. 53 U.S.L.W. 3235 (U.S. Jan. 15, 1985).
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initial argument. After a re-argument in April,6 1 the Court affirmed the
decision below.6 2
The Court's opinion in Blackfeet 11,63 reviewed the case history,
reflected upon the applicable legislative history of the Indian mineral
leasing program, reiterated the requirements necessary for a state to tax
Indian interests, and compared the 1924 and 1938 Acts. The majority
opinion rested squarely on two canons of statutory construction that apply
to Indian law. The Court, noting that the 1938 Act did not contain express
provisions allowing states to tax Indian mineral leases, held that the State
of Montana could not tax "Indian royalty income from leases issued
6 4
pursuant to the 1938 Act."1
IV.

DISCUSSION

The long-recognized trust relationship between the federal government and the Indian tribes was critical to the outcome of this case. This
trust relationship gives the federal government exclusive power to deal
with Indian tribes, 65 and prevents the states from infringing upon Indian
sovereignty over their lands.6 6 Because of the trust relationship, courts
have presumed that congressional intent toward Indian tribes is benevolent.67 Some canons of statutory construction, which have specific application to Indian law statutes, also reflect that benevolence.6 6 The practical
effect of those canons is to broadly construe statutes which reserve or
establish Indian rights and to narrowly construe statutes limiting Indian
69
rights.
The two canons of Indian law statutory construction that supported
the Tribe's opinion are as follows. First, a state may not tax Indians or their
property interests on reservations without express congressional authorization.7 0 "[S]econd, statutes are to be construed liberally in favor of the

61.

105 S. Ct. 1838 (1985). Re-arguments before the Supreme Court are rare, especially as in

this instance, when the Court was evenly divided. See R. STERN AND E.

GESSMAN, SUPREME COURT

PRACTICE, 791-93 (5th ed. 1978).
62. Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, 105 S. Ct. 2399 (1985).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 2405.

65. This authority is found in Art. I, § 8 of the U.S. Constitution. See Oneida Indian Nation v.
County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 670 (1974).
66. States have no power "to infringe upon tribal sovereignty" without congressional authority.
See Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959).
67. F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 221 (1982).
68. Id. at 225.
69. Id.
70. Montana v. Blackfeet, 105 S. Ct. at 2403 (citing Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373,393

(1976)).
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Indians, with ambiguous provisions interpreted to their benefit. . .. ""
Aided by the Ninth Circuit decision and the force of these canons of
construction, the Tribe asserted that Montana could not tax leases
executed under the 1938 Act.
The state based its argument for taxation on principles of statutory
construction arising from previous Court decisions. Those decisions
supported the notions that a general repealing clause "implies very
strongly that there may be acts on the same subject which are not thereby
repealed, ' 72 and, that there is a strong presumption against repeal by
implication.73 Underlying the state's argument was the idea that when two
acts on the same subject were not inconsistent, they could be construed
together.7 4 Since the 1938 Act did not expressly repeal the 1924 Act, and
since there is a strong presumption against repeal by implication, the State
claimed that the 1924 Act should remain in effect.7 5 It would follow then,
that since "nothing in the 1938 Act is inconsistent with the 1924 taxing
provision, 76 the tax authorization should apply to 1938 Act leases.
When two acts concern the same subject, and the acts are either
consistent, or reasonably so, both acts will be given effect.77 Where such
acts are in irreconcilable conflict, however, one act will be cited as
controlling. In such an instance, the courts will assume that the legislature
considered previous acts on the subject before it enacted the latter act; the
latter act, therefore, will control.78 Here, in suggesting that the two statutes
were not inconsistent, the state implied that the acts did not irreconcilably
conflict.
If the Court found either that the statutes were irreconcilable, or that
canons of Indian law construction would not permit taxation of 1938 Act
leases, the decision below must be upheld. The Court has previously stated
that two statutes will not be read as being in irreconcilable conflict without
seeking to ascertain congressional intent. 9 Further, canons of statutory
construction are not a license to disregard clear expressions of congressional intent.8" The Court's resolution of the congressional intent behind
the 1938 Act, therefore, becomes the determining factor.

71. 105 S. Ct. at 2403-04, (citing McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n., 411 U.S. 164,
174 (1973)).
72. 105 S. Ct. at 2403 (quoting Hess v. Reynolds, 113 U.S. 73, 79 (1885)).
73. 105 S. Ct at 2403.
74. See Posodas v. National City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 503 (1935).
75. 105 S. Ct. at 2403.
76. Id.
77. C. SANDS, supra note 32, at § 26.06
78. Id. at 454.
79. See Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 267 (1981).
80. See Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713, 733 (1983).
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The Court recognized three major goals in enacting the 1938 Act;,' all
of these goals would be prejudiced if the 1924 tax authorization were to
apply to 1938 Act leases. First, the 1924 Act was limited in its application.8 2 The 1938 Act on the other hand was intended to bring uniformity to
the Indian mineral leasing program and applied to all Indian lands.8 3 If the
1924 tax authorization were found to apply to 1938 Act leases, certain
1938 Act leases would remain untaxable. 84 The intended uniformity in the
Indian mineral leasing program would suffer.
Second, the Court recognized that the 1938 Act sought to bring the
5
greatest return possible on Indian mineral leases back to the Indians. If
the 1924 tax authorization were to apply generally to Indian mineral leases
executed under the 1938 Act, Indian mineral leases previously not taxable
would become taxable.8 Such a result would not comport with providing
the Indians with the greatest return for their property.
Third, the Court noted that Congress intended to bring the Indian
mineral leasing program into harmony with the IRA. 7 While the 1924 Act
authorized the taxation of Indian mineral leases during an era of
assimilation, the IRA sought to reverse the policies of that era. 8 The IRA
specifically provided the Indian tribes that reorganized under that Act
greater authority over their lands.8 9 To allow the 1924 tax provision to
apply to leases issued under the 1938 Act would conflict with this
legislative intent.
Despite the apparent tension between the legislative intent behind the
1938 Act and the taxation of those mineral leases, the Court avoided this
matter. The Court did state that nothing in the legislative history to the
1938 Act indicated that Congress intended state taxation of Indian
mineral leases under the 1938 Act. 0 Applying the canon of construction

81. 105 S. Ct. at 2404 n.5.
82. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
83. "Hereafter unalloted lands within any Indian reservation or lands owned by any Tribe
.
... (emphasis added). 25 U.S.C. § 396a.
84. The 1924 Act applies only to Indian mineral leases on reservations that were bought and paid
for, on lands that were unallotted, and that are not needed for agricultural or farming purposes. See
supra note 13 and accompanying text.
85. 105 S. Ct. 2404 n.5.
86. Not all Indian mineral leases were taxable, even following the 1927 Act. Specifically, Indian
mineral leases other than oil and gas leases on executive order reservations could not be taxed. See 84

Interior Dec. 905, 909 n.6.
87. 105 S. Ct. 2404 n.5.
88. The state's brief exposed some cases where the policies of the IRA were apparently argued
before the Court but not relied upon in the Court's decisions. In this case, however, there is express
indication of the intent to conform to the policies of the IRA. See Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 63-

65.
89.
90.

25 U.S.C. §§ 476-477.
105 S.Ct. at 2404.
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that the authority to tax Indian interests must be express, and recognizing
that such express authorization was lacking, the Court held that the state
could not tax Indian mineral leases executed under the 1938 Act. 91
V.

CONCLUSION

Montana v. Blackfeet identifies and reinforces the congressional
intent behind the Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938. As the Court
indicated, Congress intended that the Act bring uniformity to the Indian
mineral leasing program, bring the mineral leasing program into harmony
with the IRA, provide the Indians the best return for the use of their
property, and govern Indian mineral leases executed only after its
enactment. More importantly, the Court found that the Act did not permit
states to tax Indian mineral leases issued under that Act.
The Court does not determine whether the 1938 Act repealed the
1924 Act; that question was not before it. The Court's opinion allows the
states to continue taxing Indian mineral leases issued pursuant to the 1924
Act. This result leaves the indefinite term leases issued under the 1924 Act
unfettered. Thus, the Court has, for the time being, preserved the integrity
of indefinite term leases while settling the question of the 1938 Act's intent.
The present case settled an issue arising between the effect of the 1924
and 1938 Acts-two statutes affecting the same area. Because of strong
similarities between the 1924 and 1927 Acts, it is unlikely the question will
be relitigated for the 1927 Act. The Court's determination leaves the leases
executed under those Acts intact, but assures us that taxation under those
Acts does not apply to 1938 Act leases.

91.

Id. at 2405.

